These Cars Got Deadlier as They Got Newer

Newer model years are supposed to kill fewer people. Mandated electronic stability control, side curtain airbags, stronger rooflines, automatic emergency braking creeping into base trims—a 2018 anything should be dramatically harder to die in than a 2010 anything. And for most vehicles, it is. The Toyota Camry’s 2016–2022 model years recorded 43% fewer FARS fatalities than its 2010–2015 vintages.^[1] The Honda Civic: down 45%. Ford F-150: down 44%. The fleet got safer. That was the deal.

Eight vehicles broke the deal.

I cross-tabulated FARS model-year death counts across all 337 tracked models, grouping into two era bins: 2010–2015 and 2016–2022 model years.^[1] Five control vehicles—Silverado, F-150, Camry, Accord, Civic—averaged a 45.6% decline in newer-model-year fatalities. Expected. Boring. Good.

Then there’s the Dodge Challenger. Its 2010–2015 models appear 108 times in FARS. Its 2016–2022 models: 263 times. That’s a 144% increase in fatal crash involvement for the supposedly improved generation.^[1] The Kia Sportage climbed 136%. Ram 1500: up 134%. Chevrolet Spark: 119%. Kia Forte: 111%. Nissan Rogue: 109%.

The obvious objection: sales volume. If Nissan sold three times as many Rogues in 2018 as in 2012, more Rogues will crash. That’s arithmetic, not a design flaw. And it’s partially true. Rogue sales roughly doubled over the period.^[3] But fatalities more than doubled. The Kia Forte saw moderate sales growth and a 111% fatality surge. The Dodge Challenger’s sales didn’t triple—Dodge was selling roughly 55,000–65,000 units annually through most of that window.^[3] Something beyond volume is moving the needle.

The worsening vehicles cluster into two categories that tell different stories. First: muscle cars. The Challenger and Charger are high-horsepower, rear-wheel-drive platforms marketed on aggression. IIHS has flagged that performance vehicles attract risk-seeking drivers;^[2] newer Challengers shipped with 485–840 horsepower variants (Scat Pack at 485, Hellcat at 707, Demon at 840) that didn’t exist in 2010. More power delivered to the same driver demographic. Predictable outcome.

Second: affordable crossovers and compacts. The Rogue, RAV4, Sportage, Forte, and Spark occupied the under-$28K segment chasing first-time buyers and entry-level households.^[2] Younger, less experienced drivers logging more miles in cheaper vehicles that carried fewer optional safety features—AEB wasn’t standard on the Rogue until 2018, the Forte until 2021. IIHS ratings for the 2014 Kia Forte earned “Marginal” on small overlap front; the 2020 model improved to “Good” but still lacked standard AEB on base trims.^[2]

To estimate how many deaths exceeded the expected trajectory, I applied the control group’s average improvement rate (−45.6%) to each worsening vehicle’s 2010–2015 baseline. If the Challenger had followed the fleet trend, its 2016–2022 count would have been ~59. Actual: 263. That’s roughly 204 excess fatal crash involvements above the expected curve, for one model.^[1] Across all eight vehicles, the cumulative excess: approximately 1,840 fatal crashes above the safety curve.

Methodology

FARS model-year fatality counts (2014–2023 data years capturing 2010–2022 model-year vehicles in fatal crashes). Era bins: MY 2010–2015 vs. MY 2016–2022. Control group: five high-volume vehicles (Silverado, F-150, Camry, Accord, Civic) showing consistent decline. “Excess deaths” = actual 2016–22 count minus (2010–15 count × 0.544). This is a rough proxy—not exposure-adjusted per-VMT—but the directional signal is strong enough to warrant investigation.

Limitations

FARS captures only fatal crashes—approximately 36,000 of the ~6.7 million annual crashes. A vehicle with falling fatality counts could still have rising serious injury rates. The era bins don’t account for exact on-road exposure: a 2022 model year has had fewer years of exposure than a 2016, compressing the newer-MY counts downward. This means the true worsening trend may be even steeper than these numbers suggest. Volume adjustment using NHTSA registration data is approximate; precise VMT by model-year-vintage doesn’t exist publicly.

Strongest Counterargument

The entire effect could be explained by sales mix and driver demographics rather than vehicle design. If Dodge aggressively marketed Hellcats to younger buyers, the fatality increase reflects marketing strategy and buyer behavior, not engineering regression. The vehicles themselves may have gotten safer per-crash (better crashworthiness ratings, more standard airbags) while being sold in greater numbers to higher-risk populations. This is a valid reading of the data. But it raises its own question: if a manufacturer knows its buyer demographic skews toward higher-risk drivers, what obligation exists to make advanced safety features standard rather than optional?